abolition of this institution, a path which was followed in France for a number of years in the wake of the revolution of 1789.
If the ideological reasons for doing away with the pardoning power are rooted in constitutional theory, the practical reasons are related to the development of modern penal systems. The pardoning power has historically served a number of functions, most of which are adequately provided for today by other legal institutions which have been developed to meet these needs. For example, the avoidance of imposing criminal liability on persons lacking in mental capacity or acting in self-defense is now governed by the penal code itself. The need to assuage doubts regarding the possibility of a miscarriage ofjustice is now commonly met by a system of appeals and rehearings before the courts. The individualization of punishment is provided for within the framework of the sentencing discretion now generally bestowed upon the courts, and subsequent developments can be taken into consideration by parole boards. Even the most dramatic use of clemency powers, viz., the commutation of capital sentences, has lost much of its importance in view of the sparse use of the death penalty in contemporary times. Finally, the use of pardons to secure rehabilitation, by removing the stigma of a criminal conviction, has widely been superseded by special laws providing for judicial or statutory rehabilitation, or for the expungement of the criminal record. 4 It is not the intention of this survey to arrive at any conclusions as to the desirability or usefulness of the clemency power in the contemporary world; this is an issue which the writer has considered elsewhere. 3 The main objectives of Eden and Colquhoun, concentrated their attacks on the abuses evident in the exercise of the pardoning power, rather than its very existence. See Sebba,supra note 1. 4 See text accompanying notes 42-70 infra. 5 Sebba, supra note 1.
this comparative survey of clemency provisions throughout the world were to discover (1) the extent to which the institution of clemency is a universal feature of contemporary legal systems; (2) which bodies are formally invested with decision-making authority to grant pardons; (3) whether those or other bodies hold the reality of power in this respect; and (4) to determine the main types and functions of clemency under the various systems.
METHOD & SOURCES
The survey was conducted in the-following way: in 1970 a circular letter was sent by Professor Israel Drapkin, then Director of the Institute of Criminology in the Law Faculty of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, to some sixty different countries around the world. The requests were directed both to professional contacts in those countries, and also, with the assistance of the Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to official agencies. By this means information was received from about fifty countries. This information was later supplemented by a study of the constitutions of these and other countries, using material available from such compendia as Peaslee's Constitutions of Nations 6 and Blaustein's Constitutions of the Countries of the World.' These sources were reexamined in 1976 to allow for subsequent developments, recent political events having been cross-checked with The Statesman 's Yearbook 1975 's Yearbook -1976 The material compiled here is thus subject to the following reservations: (a) the use of nonconstitutional sources -primarily the codes of substantive and procedural penal laws of the respective countries-is selective, and is largely confined to the countries from which responses to the circular were received; (b) it may be that some recent constitutional changes (especially in the more politically volatile jurisdictions), have not yet appeared in the above-mentioned compendia, and thus will not be reflected in the analysis; (c) the nonconstitutional provisions generally reflect the state of the law in 1970. These provisions, however, being nonpolitical in character, are less prone to rapid change than the constitutions themselves. 
THE COMPARATIVE TABLE
The schedule appearing below presents the information obtained in a systematic fashion in the form of a table containing data relating to one hundred jurisdictions. The table is confined to those items on which information was most forthcoming, namely: the legal source of the pardoning authority; the mechanism whereby pardoning decisions are made; categories of offences or penalties which are excluded from the pardoning power or for which special provisions are made; and the types of pardon available in the jurisdiction concerned. Certain points of clarification, as well as additional information of interest, such as statistical data, are presented in the right-hand column.
The salient features of the survey, as well as certain areas of interest not appearing in the table (such as the relationship between the pardoning power and amnesties) are discussed in the following text.
THE EXISTENCE OF A PAIDONING POWER
Responses to the circular revealed that a power to pardon offenders existed in all the jurisdictions from which responses were obtained. Moreover, the original library survey of constitutions produced a similar result for other countries, and in only one recently adopted constitution was no reference to clemency found. The 1975 constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of China is somewhat skeletal in form and provides minimal information on the functions of the various governmental bodies. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, to which the pardoning power was entrusted under the previous constitution, has the power to "enact decrees ... and exercise such other functions and powers as are vested in it by the National People's Congress," which is "the highest organ of State power under the leadership of the Communist Party of China."' 0 Whether the pardoning power has been deliberately and finally omitted from the state fabric is thus as yet unclear.
Subject to this exception, the overall picture which emerges is that neither ideological nor practical objections to the clemency power as a legal institution in the modern age have re-I Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of China, art. 18, (adopted 1954, repealed 1975 
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POWER
The basic provisions for a pardoning power are nearly always found in the state constitution, the main departures being "basic" or "organic" laws, which in effect take the place of a constitution. Great Britain continues to rely on the royal prerogative, a recognized feature of her unwritten constitution, and this same prerogative, as delegated, also obtains in certain jurisdictions of the British Commonwealth, such as in Australia and New Zealand. It should also be observed that in countries with a federal structure, basic provisions may be found both at the federal level and within the constitutions of the individual provinces or states." The jurisdiction of the federal pardoning authority is not, however, necessarily coextensive with the jurisdiction of federal courts and laws (as in the United States). Thus, for example, in India the President may commute the death penalty even where state laws are involved. head of states, be it the president 3 or the monarch.
1 4 The vesting of the clemency powers in the head of state is consistent with the popular view of the pardon as a discretionary power entrusted to the most elevated personage in the land. Indeed, in this respect there appears to be a degree of historical continuity with the powers of the formerly autocratic monarch having been transferred to his constitutional successor, who remains the ultimate font of mercy vis-a-vis his erring subjects. Superimposed on this image is an image which attributes the pardoning power to the executive arm of government, which retains the discretion to refrain in extreme cases from absolute enforcement of the laws of the land. This dual image depends upon an identity of functions of head of state and chief executive.
That the above picture is over-simplistic is revealed by a study of the development of clemency powers over the past two centuries and by a close examination of the comparative table. The historical point may be made by reference to the constitutional histories of France and the United States. In post-revolutionary France, the acceptance of the need for a pardoning power did not entirely dispel reservations about the wisdom of concentrating the decision-making power solely in the hands of the head of state in his capacity as chief executive. The 1802 constitution provided for the establishment of an advisory council in which all three branches of government were represented.
1 Similarly, the 1848 constitution provided for mandatory consultation with the Conseil d'Etat, and in serious cases (i.e., convictions in the High Court) the right to pardon was reserved to the National Assembly. Finally, under the constitution of the Fourth Republic, the power was vested in the President sitting in the High Council of the Judiciary, an indication that the power was not 13 The Cyprus constitution provides for a distribution of power between President and Vice-President, reflecting the respective community affiliations of the holders of these offices.
" The King or Queen (Belgium, the British Commonwealth, Denmark, Nepal, the Netherlands, and Norway); the Prince (Monaco and Liechtenstein); the Emperor (Japan); the Grand-Duke (Luxembourg); the Amir (Kuwait) or the Yang di Pertuan Agong (Malaysia). to be regarded as purely executive in nature. 6 In the United States the theory prevailed that the power to grant clemency, like all other powers, ultimately resided with the people, who were consequently able to delegate it to whichever body they chose.1 7 The identity of the preferred body tended to vary from era to era. During the pre-Independence period there were three models for the institution of clemency: (a) vesting the power in the governor; (b) vesting the power in the governor acting only with the consent of the Executive Council; (c) vesting the power in the legislature. During the period 1790-1860 there was a revival in public trust in the executive, and twenty-one states adopted model (a), while four preferred model (b). Since 1860, in keeping with the increasing professionalization of the pardoning power, the majority of state constitutions have provided for some sort of autonomous board of pardons having either formal decision-making power or at least an advisory role in this respect.
An analysis of the comparative Under the new Swedish constitution, on the other hand, the pardoning power is vested in the government as such. In Sweden, the executive body does not play the additional role of head of state, a function still fulfilled by the monarchy, now apparently deprived of any substantial power 19 Finally, in a few countries the power to pardon offenders is reserved exclusively to the legislature.
2 This is the situation under the constitutions of Switzerland, Uruguay and, for some purposes, Turkey. In Nicaragua the power is vested primarily in the legislature, but supplementary powers are also granted to the President and the judiciary. It is thus evident that the clemency power is not universally regarded as the sole prerogative of the head of state. Indeed, the only clear feature emerging from an analysis of the constitutions included in the present survey is that in no case is this power vested primarily 2 ' in a judicial authority. Nor does the model of the head of state acting within the framework of a judicial body 22 appear to be prevalent today. Since the role of the head of state is at times ambiguous, the fact that the head of state may be the sole repository of the clemency power does not in itself unequivocally determine the constitutional nature of the power. In historic times, the sovereign ruler generally combined the functions of all three branches of government-executive, legislative and judicial-and even as these functions became differentiated, he continued to play a pivotal role in all three branches. Thus the British Crown formally re-" The Instrument of Government of 1974 refers to the duties and the functions of the monarch, but does not specify what they are. The intention of depriving the monarchy of its powers, however, was evidenced by a provision specifying that the articles of the constitution relating to the monarchy would become effective only upon the death of the then-reigning monarch. 20 It may be that in some jurisdictions vesting the pardoning power in the executive or other body does not deprive the legislature of an equivalent power. In this connection see Weihofen, Legislative Pardons, 27 CAL. L. REV. 371 (1939) immunity in respect of the pardoning power with that ofjudges and advocates. Characterization of the source of the pardoning power as executive or otherwise (the "organic" criterion) should, however, be differentiated from the characterization of the exercise of this power (the "functional" criterion). Applying the functional criterion, many governmental acts are of a mixed character and cannot readily be denominated as either "legislative," "executive," or 'judicial." KLINGHOFFER, ADMINIS-TRATIVE LAW (1957) . In Israel, as in the United States, the attorney general's discretionary power in the matter of prosecution has been labeled by the courts as "quasi-judicial."
27 In France, the immunity of the exercise of the clemency powers from judicial review had always been attributed to its classification as an "act of state." In 1947, however, the Conseil d' Etat concluded that immunity from judicial review derived from the judicial character of the pardon. MONTEIL, supra note 15 at 56-57.
' Constitutions may be differentiated according to the degree to which the executive is subject to the control of the legislature, distinguishing the "presidential-executive" model from the "parliamentaryexecutive" model. L. WOLF-PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONS OF MODERN STATES xix (1968). In states following the latter model, the head of state is less likely to have substantial political power.
United States serves simultaneously as head of state and as the sole chief executive, 2 9 the presidents of the Federal German Republic and of Israel are for the most part symbolic figures, the effective political power being wielded by the Federal Chancellor and Prime Minister, respectively. The French presidency fulfills a role somewhere between these extremes, for although the office of Prime Minister also exists under the French constitution, substantial executive power is retained by the President."
This variance in the nature of the presidential role seems to add strength to the view that the dominant tradition is essentially one of vesting clemency powers in the head of state as such, and not specifically in his capacity as chief executive. Thus, the Communist states which entrust these powers to a presidential or state council, rather than to the Council of Ministers, are substantially in keeping with this tradition. The main exceptions remain those few jurisdictions which seem reluctant to confide a power to interfere with the judicial process in any body other than the legislative assembly, which in most systems is regarded as the ultimate sovereign authority.3I
The preceding analysis has been confined to a discussion of the formal vesting of the clemency powers as reflected in basic constitutional provisions. There are two reasons, however, why the designated body may not necessarily wield substantial power. First, the constitution may expressly provide that the power is to be exercised on the advice of some other body. Secondly, even without such express provision, the constitutional norms or practice of the individual country may require that the acts of the formal authority, especially those of a symbolic head of state, require the sanction of a more actively political figure. These situations will be considered in the next section.
THE INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER BODIES IN THE

CLEMENCY DECISION
In most jurisdictions the clemency process involves more than a petition from the offender 29 See also art. 5 of the Chad Constitution of 1962, which specifies that "the President of the Republic shall be the Head of State and of the Government."
" But with regard to his clemency powers, see note 27 supra.
"' In this respect, the legislature may be seen to wear the mantle of the erstwhile monarch, whose pardoning power was regarded as simply an incident of his sovereignty. See 1939 SURVEY, supra note 17, at directly to the pardoning body, followed by the latter's decision. A more complex procedure is usually adopted, involving the examination of the petition and the issuing of an opinion on the part of some other body. The question arises as to the nature of such "secondary" bodies and their power vis-a-vis the "primary" decision-making body.
Under some systems it is explicitly stated that the ultimate decision belongs to the primary body alone." Other systems, on the other hand, specify that the primary pardoning authority is not entitled to exercise this function of his own accord, but is dependent on the initiative or recommendation of another. This may be provided for by the constitutional or other statutory provisions 33 relating to clemency. Alternatively, the accepted constitutional practice of the state (whether on a written or conventional basis) may require that the powers of the primary authority-especially where this authority is no more than a political figureheadbe exercised only in accordance with the wishes of the government or its appointee. It is, indeed, most frequently the executive arm which is designated as the "recommending" body. This is the case under the constitutions of Austria, Greece, the Irish Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Niger, Rhodesia, Singapore, South Africa and Sri Lanka. In these cases it seems clear that the "secondary" authority has been granted the effective decision-making power. 35 In Great Britain, on the other hand, it is the constitutional convention which has transferred effective power from the Crown to the Home Secretary. Under many constitutions no such advisory role is explicitly attributed to the government or its representatives. The same result is 87. The modern trend, however, is to attribute sovereignty to the people. See, e.g., art. 4 of the Constitution of Uruguay.
32 The Zambian Constitution provides that the President acts "in his own deliberate judgement and shall not be obliged to follow the advice tendered by any other person or authority."
33 The constitutional provisions themselves frequently state that the constitutional powers will be exercised "in accordance with the law."
3 See, e.g., art. 67 of the Austrian constitution. Except, perhaps, in the case of Niger, where the language is somewhat equivocal.
" The development of this convention during the course of the past two centuries is described in F.
BRESLER, REPRIEVE (1965) . achieved in practice, however, by the device of ministerial countersignature. These constitutions specify that decisions emanating from the primary authority require the countersignature of the prime minister, or the minister responsible for the matter to which the decision relates, or both. Such a requirement appears, inter alia, in the constitutions of Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Spain and Turkey. It also appears in some constitutions (Austria, Greece and South Africa) in which another governmental authority is designated as enjoying a "recommending" capacity, further emphasizing the role of this authority in the clemency process.
It is sometimes specified, 37 and nearly always implied, that the absence of the required countersignature would render the clemency decision nugatory. Further, since the effect of such countersignature is to render the countersigning minister or ministers responsible for the decision, 38 the view is generally held by the governments or ministers concerned that even if no "advisory" role is imputed to them by the constitution, they are nevertheless entitled to an effective and perhaps decisive say in the pardoning decision. The French Minister of Justice, M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen, once stated that his obligation to countersign presidential clemency orders did not depend upon his concurring with their content, which remained within the exclusive prerogative of the President. 39 A happier solution, in this writer's view, is that obtaining in the Congo (and formerly 11 Art. 75 of the Chilean constitution specifies that all orders of the President of the Republic must be signed by the minister of the respective department, and "shall not be obeyed without this essential requirement."
31 Such responsibility is generally understood to be political, but under some systems may also connote legal responsibility. J. Laferribre, Le Contreseing Ministriel, in LA REVUE GE NgRALE D' ADMINISTRATION 39 (1908) .
11 See MONTEIL, supra note 15, at 46-47. The siiuation in Israel in this respect has been analyzed in L. Sebba, Pardon and Amnesty-Juridical and Penological Aspects (1975) (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Jerusalem) (hereinafter cited as Sebba, 1975] . where it was concluded that the intention of the basic law was to vest effective decision-making power in the President despite the requirement of a ministerial countersignature.A "middle" view, advocated by Professor Klinghoffer, regards the clemency decision as an example of a "composite act." See also H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 95-96 (1945) .
PARDONING POWER also in Dahomey), where the requirement of a ministerial countersignature for acts performed by the President is dispensed within the exercise of the pardoning power. Just as the requirement of the countersignature is often waived for the appointment or dismissal of ministers, so too, a distinction could be made between purely formal duties of state, where the requirement would apply, and functions involving a genuine exercise of presidential prerogative powers, where it would not.
Recommendations do not emanate exclusively from executive sources. They also may issue from bodies of ajudicial, quasi-judicial or legislative character. Some constitutions (Algeria, Upper Volta, Zaire) follow the French model and bestow an advisory role on the High Council of the Judiciary. In Chad such a role is granted to the Supreme Court itself. In Vietnam, on the other hand, a special committee of the National Assembly exists for this purpose. Finally, some constitutions provide for the establishment of an Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy (Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia), a Pardons Board (Malaysia), a High Council of Pardons (Ivory Coast) or other consultative council (Greece). The body designated by the constitution for an advisory role may thus be associated with any of the three branches of government, or it may constitute an ad hoc combination.
It should be again emphasized that the actual power of these "secondary" bodies in the decision-making process may vary considerably.
0
The formulation of the constitutional provisions may not be decisive in this respect.
Finally, it should be pointed out that under most systems there will exist some machinery for investigating the circumstances of the individual petitions. Such investigation may be required of a particular body, perhaps judicial, whose purpose is less to advise than to gather or sift the information on the basis of which a decision can subsequently be made. The role of these investigative bodies-a few of which appear in the fifth column of the table below-will rarely be mentioned in the constitutional provisions, and their status may best be labeled "tertiary." 40 The role of the consultative council in Greece is clearly subsidiary to that of the Minister of Justice. Even though consultation with the council is mandatory, it should rather be classified as a "tertiary" body.
SPECIAL CATEGORIES
The constitutional provisions relating to pardon are usually stated in general terms, which do not indicate the precise scope of the pardoning power. Questions as to the applicability of pardons to disciplinary offences or to administrative penalties are left to supplementary legislation or judicial interpretation. On the other hand, in at least two special areas, it is not unusual to find express reference to certain categories of offence, offender or penalty.
The first area is that of political crimes. Here the special provisions may apply to political offences in general, but often relate specifically to proceedings of impeachment involving members of the government. In such cases, restrictions are imposed upon the exercise of the pardoning power. Clearly a system which provides for impeachment proceedings as a means of exercising legislative control over the executive would be frustrated if the executive could simply void the proceedings at will by granting pardons. For this reason the application of the pardoning power to impeachment proceedings is often made dependent upon the initiative or the consent of the legislative body. Such is the case in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg. In Finland the initiative must come from the High Court of Impeachment. Under the Chilean constitution, the pardoning power is itself reserved to Congress in such cases. In Norway the only form of clemency which may be exercised in cases of impeachment is the commutation of the death penalty.
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As to the application of the pardoning power to political offences in general, the philosophy expressed in the constitutional provisions is far from uniform. For while Liberia excludes all political offences from the President's power to pardon, in Colombia and Panama a power to pardon is granted to the President only in relation to political offences. In Nicaragua the pardoning power is exercised with greater facility in these cases. The Congress can pardon political offenders without the initiative on the part of the executive required in other cases, and the President may also grant such pardons when the Congress is adjourned. Finally, in New Zealand and Queensland it is provided " Other forms of restriction are found in Zaire and the Philippines. that the pardoning of political offenders may be made conditional on their banishment.
The other area in which special provisions are frequently found is that of the death penalty. The most usual type of provision mandates that capital punishment cases be reviewed by the body or bodies whose task it is to consider applications for pardon. This applies, for example, to the Advisory Committees on the Prerogative of Mercy in Kenya, Malawi, Uganda and Zambia, as well as to the appropriate authorities in Malta, Singapore and Sri Lanka. In Jordan all death sentences require the confirmation of the King. The object of all these provisions is clearly to ensure that, where the ultimate penalty is to be inflicted, no case deserving of consideration by the clemency authorities will be overlooked as the result of a failure on the part of the defendant to submit a petition, or for want of adequate investigation.
On the other hand are the provisions obtaining in New Zealand, where the death penalty can be commuted only by a decision of the Executive Council and in Turkey, where the decision must be made by the legislative assembly. These models appear to indicate a harsher policy towards capital cases, since the decisionmaking power has been vested in a more formal body.
TYPES OF PARDON
As indicated in the introductory section, the institution of pardon is an ancient one, and throughout history it has served a number of functions, according to the needs of particular legal systems at particular times. It is not therefore surprising that a multitude of terms were applied to the clemency function and that their usage has not always been consistent. Thus, in the English language alone, the following terms are encountered: free pardon, full pardon, conditional pardon, commutation, remission, reprieve, respite, amnesty, clemency, mercy.
By way of illustrating the problematic nature of the terminology, a comparative observation may be made regarding the laws prevailing in the United States, England and Israel respectively. The United States Constitution followed the English jurists in providing for reprieves and pardons. 42 The term pardon is used in a generic sense, and apparently includes both reduction or remission of sentence as well as commuta-42 U.S. CONsT. art. II, Sec. 2.
tion, but not reprieves, which are specified independently. In England, on the other hand, the term "commutation" was never generally adopted. The substitution of one penalty for another was included in the rubric of the "conditional pardon." It was thus not surprising that the Israeli Supreme Court, faced with a law providing for "pardons and reductions of sentences, 43 examined both English and American sources, but was unable to reach unanimity on the question as to whether commutations were included. 44 The majority of constitutions do not directly address these questions. Instead, the precise forms which the clemency power may take are left to regular or even subsidiary legislation, or to judicial interpretation. It was the practice in British colonial legislation, however, to specify the various forms of clemency, and this model can still be found in the basic provisions of Kenya, Malaysia, Malta, New Zealand, Nigeria, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Zambia. The forms commonly specified in these jurisdictions are (a) pardon, free or conditional; (b) respite of execution for a specified or indeterminate period; (c) substitution of a less severe form of punishment (commutation); 4 1 (d) remission of the whole or part of the punishment. The last type usually specifies that remission may apply to any penalty or forfeiture incurred for any offence, and this would appear to include sanctions incurred by way of administrative proceedings.
The legal provisions which describe the various types of pardon rarely specify the objective for which each type is intended. 46 In this respect the fourfold typology mentioned in the last paragraph is consistent with the impression created by the clemency provisions of most legal systems, namely that they are designed to 41 This type is not specified in the provisions of New Zealand and Singapore. As mentioned above, however, commutation was traditionally achieved in England by means of the conditional pardon.
46 One notable exception relates to the pardon of accomplices; see text accompanying notes 52-54 infra.
[Vol. 68 facilitate a post-convictional modification of judgment, usually because of changes in the offender's personal conduct or circumstances, or possibly because of doubts relating to the propriety of his conviction. The last consideration is more evident in jurisdictions influenced by the common law, since a "free pardon" implies some form of corrective to the conviction itself. 47 The French gr&e, on the other hand, is concerned exclusively with the punishment. The main reason for this difference between the two systems is that the French legal system developed a separate remedy for suspected miscarriages of justice: rivision, or retrial. This is a special form of court proceeding which may be instigated for specified reasons.
48 This institution is generally foreign to the common-law countries, 49 which rely on the pardoning power to accomplish this purpose. 50 In this connection it may be mentioned that the Mexican constitution has adopted a middle road and distinguishes pardons "of necessity," which will be automatically granted on proof of miscarriage of justice, from pardons "of grace," which are discretionarily granted for outstanding services to the state. 5 1 In the former case, specified grounds of application are laid down which are. almost identical with the grounds for applying for revision under French law.
Another objective of the pardon reflected in the clemency provisions of some countries relates to the role of criminal accomplices. The clemency provisions of New Zealand, Singapore and Sri Lanka state that an accomplice 47 The extent to which a pardon serves to eliminate all the adverse effects of a conviction has been a topic of considerable debate in Anglo-American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1915) ; Weihofen, The Effect of a Pardon, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 177 (1939) . 48 In brief, these reasons include: (a) the live appearance of the "victim" of a homicide; (b) the conviction of another defendant for the same offence, revealing an inconsistency; (c) the conviction for perjury of one of the witnesses at the original trial; (d) the emergence of new evidence indicating the accused's innocence. 49 Israel has attempted to merge both legal traditions in this area; see, Courts Law § 9 (1957) .
50 The manner in which the clemency powers have been exercised to remedy miscarriages of justice has been the subject of concern in recent years. See Jus-TICE, HOME OFFICE REVIEWS OF CRIMINAL CONVIC-
TIONS (1968).
"' Compare the old English distinction between "pardons of course and right," and "pardons of grace"; M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 250 (1678).
who provides information leading to the conviction of the principal offender may be pardoned. This type of pardon appears to be confined exclusively to countries influenced by the common law. It reflects a practice which was considered the mainstay of the English criminal justice system during the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries.
5 2 It was thought that only by making such an offer to the accomplice could the principal be apprehended and convicted. 5 This practice, however, was the subject of much controversy and has since fallen into desuetude. The modern system of "turning King's (State's) evidence" is no longer conditional on the grant of a pardon. Nevertheless, as noted, many hitherto colonial jurisdictions still retain this form of pardon, at least formally. As a concluding note on this topic, it should be observed that this type of pardon, apart from being controversial as a matter of policy, also has an unusual feature from the formal point of view. It is the only form of pardon designed specifically for offenders-or rather for suspects-who have not yet been convicted by the courts. Most otherjurisdictions preclude any exercise of clemency prior to conviction; 5 4 and even some jurisdictions providing for the pardon of accomplices (e.g., New Zealand) do not allow for pre-convictional pardon in any other case.
Another purpose of the pardoning power in some jurisdictions is to remove the stigma of past convictions. Here the clemency power is usually invoked a considerable period of time after the sentence has been served, and the offender has had an opportunity to prove that he has earned his reinstatement as a first-class citizen. In recent years, the increasing sensitiv-" See Radzinowicz, supra note 25, Vol. II at 53. ' The provisions themselves may specify application to "convicted offenders" or "penalties"; or the traditional interpretation of the clemency institution, as in the case of the French grace, may be so limited. The U.S. Constitution, on the other hand, which refers only to "offences," is thought to permit preconvictional pardons, as illustrated by the Nixon case. Czechoslovakia and Liechtenstein also provide for the suspension or cancellation of criminal proceedings as part of the clemency power, while in Iceland the President may order the withdrawal of a prosecution "for cogent reasons." See also the new Swedish constitution.
ity to the need for removing the stigma attached to the ex-offender has given rise to a number of attempts to produce a comprehensive solution to this problem. Included among these attempts are expunging the criminal record;" 3 providing for its non-disclosure after a specified period of time has passed since the conviction was imposed or the sentence served;-" or the use of special evidentiary rules based on similar considerations." The French system, and those which it has influenced, have long maintained a special institution for this purpose, la rihabilitation, where rights can be restored either byjudicial decision or, in minor cases, by automatic operation of law. Other systems, however, including some which are only now adopting one of the alternative solutions indicated above, have used the pardoning power to this end. In some cases, such as Belgium and Japan, this objective is prominently mentioned in the statutory provisions relating to the pardoning power. In the last instance at least, "legal" rehabilitation can be regarded not as an incidental consequence of pardon, but as one of its major forms.
Consideration of the types of pardon existing under various systems around the world cannot be concluded without some reference to amnesties. The current survey does not purport to deal with the subject of amnesties, since amnesties are analytically distinct from pardons from a juridical point of view and are so dominated by their political connotations that they seem to have little in common with other forms of clemency. The relationship of amnesty to these forms of clemency, however, must be clarified here.
The term "amnesty" generally connotes an institution differentiated from pardon in the following respects: (a) it is general, in that it applies to categories of offenders and not to named individuals; (b) it removes the effects of the conviction and not merely of the sentence; ' See generally Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. P. S. 347 (1968) .
36 See Israel's Criminal Registration Bill (1975) , and similar proposals in various jurisdictions in the United States, such as Pennsylvania.
57 See England's Rehabilitation of Offenders Act (1974), which renders evidence of "old" convictions (determined on the basis of given criteria) inadmissible in court.
-8 For Belgium, see art. 87 of the Penal Code; for Japan, see The Offenders Rehabilitation Law (1949). and (c) it applies primarily to political offences. 9 As a result of these differences, many constitutions exclude the power to grant amnesty from the clemency power vested in the head of state or chief executive, and grant it instead to the legislature. This has almost become an additional identifying characteristic of an amnesty. Typical examples of constitutions reserving the right of amnesty to the legislature, while vesting the power to pardon in the head of state, are Finland, Jordan, the Netherlands and Panama. Other constitutions, however, such as those of Burma and the German Democratic Republic, recognize the distinction between pardons and amnesties, but vest both powers in the same body.
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The English common law, however, has never developed the concept of an amnesty. The historical practice of passing Acts of Grace has ceased, 6 ' and the occasional need for an amnesty of prisoners is met today through the exercise of executive clemency powers. Similarly, under American law, because the Constitution refers only to pardons and reprieves, it was uncertain which branch of government would have the power to grant amnesty and how far its effects would differ from those of a pardon. 62 In practice, amnesty proclamations have on occasion been made by the President, sometimes supported by Congressional action . 3 Further confusion has been created by the concept of the "general" or "collective" pardon.
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In recent times there has been criticism of the practice of granting amnesties for non-political offences in some countries. "Ils ont ainsi fait de 'amnistie, dans certain cas, une sorte de grice ou de rehabilitation,jetant ainsi le trouble dans la technique juridique" (Thus, they have made amnesty, in certain cases, a kind of pardon or rehabilitation, throwing the confusion into the judicial procedure.). P.
BOUZAT & J. PINATEL, TRAIT9 Dr DROIT PLNAL ET tE CRIMINOLOGIE 685 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
60 In some of these instances, where the term amnesty is coupled in the same provision with the pardoning powers, it may also appear in the comparative These terms ostensibly indicate acts resembling a pardon in all respects save that the beneficiaries are designated by category rather than on an individual basis.
64 Some legal systems, therefore, assimilate the general pardon with the regular pardoning power, and distinguish it from amnesty. For example, the Belgian king has the power to grant not only individual, but also collective pardons, while the right to grant amnesty is reserved to the legislature. In other jurisdictions, however, the generality of the power is the critical feature. Thus, under the constitution of Chile, which vests the individual pardoning power in the President, general pardons are classified with amnesties and fall within the prerogative of the legislature.65
Conceptual uncertainty is compounded by the linguistic translation of terminology involved in a survey such as the one upon which the current analysis is based, as well as by the translation of the very concepts and institutions themselves from one system to another. Thus, the Hebrew expression usually used to denote amnesty literally means "general pardon," and differentiation between the effects of amnesty and pardon under Israeli law becomes difficult. 66 This problem is aggravated in countries, including Israel, which have been influenced by the common law. At common law, one of the functions of the pardon is to undo the effects of a conviction, a result which is generally seen as the identifying characteristics of amnesty.
67
64 These pardons normally take the form of a reduction in the length of prison sentences in honor of some national or royal celebration. They are thus distinct in character from the political amnesty. Unlike individual pardons, however, their rationale is to be found in the special situation or mood of the benefactor, rather than in the circumstances of the beneficiary. 65 The term "general pardon" sometimes refers to the practice of granting a number of pardons to named individuals at the same time. Examples of this are the French grdces gdnirales annuelles, and the pardons granted three times per year in the Dominican Republic. See comparative table. Such pardons are analytically indistinguishable from individual pardons and must be differentiated from the grdces collectives discussed above.
66 See Sebba, 1975 , supra note 39. Conversely, the individual pardon under Japanese law is generally translated as "special amnesty."
67 Since the Israeli Amnesty Law of 1967 had a "saving" clause which restricted its effects to those expressly provided within the statute itself, the effects were less far-reaching than those of a pardon. Under Finally, reference must be made to two other "hybrid" institutions. First, the term indulto, which appears in legal literature of the Spanish speaking countries, is generally the equivalent of the French grdce. In Uruguay, however, indulto, like amnistia, is a legislative prerogative, gracia being granted by the High Court (in military cases by the President). Similarly, in Italy the government is empowered to pass legislation granting either amnesty or indulto, the legal outcome of the latter resembling that of the presidential pardon (grazia).
6s Secondly, in the French legal literature the expressions grdce amnistiante or grdce amnistielle are encountered. These refer to a discretionary power, vested in the President or the government under an amnesty law, to apply amnesty to selected individuals falling within certain categories.
6 9 Analytically, therefore, this is a form of amnesty.
70
EFFECTS OF PARDON
The aspect of the pardoning power which probably attracts the most attention in the legal literature of the individual countries concerns the legal effects of the pardon. No attempt will be made to deal with this topic comprehensively within the framework of this analysis. There are two reasons for this: first, the problems arising are too manifold, and the solutions developed by the various jurisdictions too diffuse to bear systematic comparison. Second, the norms applicable in this area are not usually found in the constitutions, but rather in regular codes, special statutes relating to pardons, or in the case law. Accordingly, this analysis will be confined to three observations. First, the civil law systems, as indicated earlier, generally emphasize that Israeli law, the effects of a pardon have been held to include the obligation of the state to repay a fine imposed as a result of the offense to which the pardon relates. Under civil law systems, the effects of an amnesty are, of course, much more extensive that those of a pardon, which is normally confined to that portion of the punishment remaining executory. tems might conceal practical differences which would only emerge on closer scrutiny of the systems concerned, while apparent differences might disappear. The present survey is not a substitute for a detailed study of the dynamics of the pardoning mechanism in individual countries, including an analysis of the cases or types of cases in which pardons are actually granted. Where pardons are used as a tool in the reformation of the offender-and this is their most common function today-an evaluation of their effectiveness for this purpose would not be amiss.
